




We present a precise form of structural realism, called group structural realism, which iden-
tifies ‘structure’ in quantum theory with symmetry groups. However, working out the details
of this view actually illuminates a major problem for structural realism; namely, a structure
can itself have structure. This paper argues that, once a precise characterization of structure is
given, the ‘metaphysical hierarchy’ on which group structural realism rests is overly extrava-
gant and ultimately unmotivated.
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1 Introduction
There is a part of structural realism that is basically correct, and a basic consequence of structural
realism that is deeply implausible. The goal of this paper is to clear the muck around what structural
realism gets right, in order to bring out a new difficulty facing the view.
The thesis of the paper has both a positive and a negative part. The positive part is this:
• Structural realism has a solid basis in quantum physics, which provides valuable insight into
both the nature of measurable quantities, as well as into what’s preserved when theories
change.
In particular, structural realists have been correct to insist on the fundamental importance of sym-
metry groups in the foundations of quantum theory. We will draw out the precise view that lurks
behind this insistence, and give it a name: group structural realism.
Group structural realism will provide us with a concrete viewpoint from which to survey a
general difficulty for structural realism. The statement of this problem is the negative part of the
thesis:
• The ‘metaphysical hierarchy’ on which structural realism rests is overly extravagant at best,
and arbitrary worst.
The paper is organized into two parts: first, an exposition of group structural realism, in which
we develop the positive thesis; and second, a critique of structural realism, in which we develop
the negative. The first part begins with a general picture of group structural realism in contrast
with related accounts. We demonstrate the connection this view provides between structure and
measurable quantities, and then offer some positive remarks about theory change. The second part
illustrates how structural realism is troubled by the existence of ‘higher’ structures. We show that
in the case of group structural realism, these higher structures also provide a positive account of
theory change, and finally argue that there appears to be no well-motivated way to incorporate
them into the structural realist picture.
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2 What Is (Group) Structural Realism?
2.1 The Basic Picture
John Worrall (1989) suggested that some notion of ‘structure’ might allow scientific realists to
overcome the problems posed by theory change and the pessimistic meta-induction. This view
was later developed by James Ladyman (1998) into an explicit metaphysical thesis, which begins
by ‘taking structure to be primitive and ontologically subsistent’ (Ladyman 1998, pp. 420). Now,
many realists are advocating an ontology that gives structural relations a more central role than
individual objects1.
The positive claim of structural realism differs greatly from author to author. Notably,
structural realists break down into ‘eliminativist’ and ‘non-eliminativist’ accounts. While the for-
mer eliminates objects (claiming that only structure exists), the latter merely demotes (but does
not eliminate) objects to a lesser metaphysical status. However, there is one core assumption that
most accounts of structural realism (as a metaphysical view) do share:
The Structural Realist Hierarchy. The existing entities described by a scientific theory are orga-
nized into a hierarchy, in which ‘structure’ occupies the top, most fundamental position.
The eliminativist takes this hierarchy to contain only structure (or perhaps even just one
structure, making the hierarchy trivial). The non-eliminativist allows the hierarchy to contain
objects in some low-status position. In the latter case, what it means to be ‘fundamental’ in a hier-
archy of entities can be cashed out in various ways. For example, Ladyman and Ross characterize
it using the notion of supervenience on properties:
Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) is the view that the world has an objective modal
structure that is ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not supervening on the in-
trinsic properties of a set of individuals. According to OSR, even the identity and indi-
viduality of objects depends on the relational structure of the world. (Ladyman and Ross 2007,
pp. 130.)
Unfortunately, the precise notion of priority that’s at stake here remains obscure. One can always
resort to analogies: the droplets of paint on a canvas might be considered more fundamental than
1For an overview, see (Ladyman 2009).
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the images in the painting, because the images supervene on the droplets. Similarly; the atoms
in a molecule are more fundamental than the molecule itself, which is more fundamental than
the substance. Structural realists argue that at the very top, at the most fundamental layer of this
hierarchy, there is only structure. But these analogies break down: images in a painting certainly
cannot exist in the absence of paint droplets, but the shadowy existence of structure is much less
clear2.
Our strategy here will be to grant the structural realist as much as possible on such matters,
by leaving open exactly how one might understand ‘priority’ in a metaphysical hierarchy. Instead,
we will assume that a such a notion can be established, and is capable of either
• providing a well-motivated description of the structure that is most fundamental ; or
• describing a multiplicity of fundamental structures, which better informs our understanding
of what exists,
given the history of our best scientific theories. In the next subsection, we will describe a precise
example from quantum theory, which appears to provide a promising way to establish the structural
realist hierarchy. Unfortunately, we must later struggle with a dilemma, which suggests that the
existence of higher structures thwarts the success of either option.
Why propose a structural realist hierarchy? Broadly speaking, there are two main goals.
First: structural realism aims to provide a general, programmatic account of science and scien-
tific discovery. Structural realist accounts of the metaphysics of theory change, such as Ladyman
(1998), are canonical examples. Second: structural realism aims to solve specific problems in
the interpretation of a theory. For example, it has been proposed as a solution to the problem of
identical particles (Ladyman and Ross 2007, §3.1), and to the problem of interpreting spacetime
points (Ladyman 1998; Dorato 2000). Which structures are of interest may differ depending on
one’s goals. To avoid confusion, we will thus focus our attention in this paper on the first goal: for
structural realism to provide an improved account of how theories change.
Standing between structural realism and what it endeavors to achieve is the meaning of the
word structure. Ladyman and French themselves note that ‘Because of the width of its embrace and
2Kantorovich (2006) has recently argued that some structures can exist even in the absence of particles.
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its complex history, defining what is meant by “structure” and characterizing the tendency in gen-
eral, is problematic’ (French and Ladyman 2008, §1). Ladyman and Ross similarly accept the crit-
icism that structural realism may not be well ‘worked out.’ However, they retort that ‘it is far from
clear that OSR’s rivals are ‘worked out’ in any sense that OSR isn’t’ (Ladyman and Ross 2007, pp.
155).
Clearly, someone ought to work something out. As a start, I will try to show that, using
the resources of group theory and quantum mechanics, a precise characterization of ‘structure’ can
be worked out in as much detail as you like. The specific view that I propose we work out is the
following:
Group Structural Realism (GSR). The existing entities described by quantum theory are orga-
nized into a hierarchy, in which a particular symmetry group occupies the top, most fundamental
position.
Like the structural realist hierarchy set out above, this statement of GSR should be taken as
a minimal assumption of the view. Focusing on this assumption allows us to leave the exact nature
of a group structure’s ‘existence’ to the individual metaphysician.
GSR has a good deal of precedent among structural realists. For example, Aharon Kan-
torovich argues for a conception of particle physics in which ‘internal symmetry is the deepest
layer in the ontological hierarchy,’ and in particular, that ‘flavor SU(3) symmetry was ontologically
prior to hadrons [. . . ] whereas SU(5) is ontologically prior only to baryons’ (Kantorovich 2003,
pp. 673). Holger Lyre has suggested an account of objects that ‘takes the group structure as primar-
ily given, group representations are then construed from this structure and have a mere derivative
status’ (Lyre 2004, pp. 663). Similarly, Ladyman and Ross argue that, ‘elementary particles are hy-
postatizations of sets of quantities that are invariant under the symmetry groups of particle physics’
(Ladyman and Ross 2007, pp. 147).
Unlike many more abstract accounts of structural realism, quantum theory provides GSR
with a precise connection to the physical quantities that we actually observe and measure in the
lab. In the next section, we will review the physical results that provide this connection.
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2.2 Wigner’s Legacy
Yuval Ne’eman and Shlomo Sternberg have recorded an old particle physicist’s adage:
Ever since the fundamental paper of Wigner on the irreducible representations of the
Poincare´ group, it has been a (perhaps implicit) definition in physics that an elementary
particle ‘is’ an irreducible representation of the group, G, of ‘symmetries of nature’.
(Ne’eman and Sternberg 1991, pp. 327.)
Despite their abstractness, irreducible unitary representations do seem to satisfy our intuitions
about elementary particles. Jonathan Bain suggests two such intuitions: (1) an elementary particle
should be uniquely labeled by a mass and a spin parameter (that is, by the eigenvalues of a total
4-momentum and a total 4-angular momentum operator); and (2) a particle should be invariant up
to the group of spacetime symmetries, in order to satisfy ‘our intuitions concerning the continuity
of particle identity through time’ (Bain 2000, pp. 402fn). One also wants that, (3) an elementary
particle cannot be ‘decomposed’ into further particles; and (4) a particle should be associated with
a set of observables that describe its possible states.
One can now observe: Wigner showed that the irreducible unitary representations of the
Poincare´ group do indeed satisfy (1) and (3) because of irreducibility; they satisfy (2) because they
represent the Poincare´ group; and, they satisfy (4) because they are unitary3.
Although this metaphysical picture of ‘particles as representations’ is often attributed to
Wigner, he does not seem to have advocated it in print. The famous (1939) paper that Ne’emann
and Sternberg refer to sets out only to correlate the values of physical magnitudes (the so-called
‘quantum numbers’) with parameters labeling group representations – in particular, the represen-
tations of the spacetime symmetry group. By classifying all the irreducible unitary representations
of this group, Wigner is able to identify all the possible labels of mass, spin and parity. This pro-
vides a tight connection between a symmetry group of nature, and the measurable properties of a
quantum system.
A simple textbook example will help to illustrate this connection. Take a familiar physical
property like angular momentum. In a given situation, quantum theory assigns a fixed value to
3Here’s a sketch of how one can obtain (4). The Poincare´ group is the product of 1-parameter subgroups. Consider
a strongly continuous unitary representation of any such subgroup. Stone’s theorem guarantees that this representation
is generated by a unique self-adjoint operatorH . This operator is an observable, in any state space on which U acts.
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some aspects of angular momentum, like (say) the total angular momentum of an isolated system.
Other aspects, such as ‘angular momentum in the z-direction,’ might (prior to measurement) be
assigned a spectrum of values. Wigner’s approach allows us to think of physical magnitudes such
as these as properties of a symmetry group.
To simplify our example, we can ignore the existence of spin4. One begins with the group
SO(3) of continuous rotations about a point. The faithful irreducible representations of SO(3)
turn out to be representable by groups of complex-valued matrices of odd dimension (2j + 1),
where j is a positive integer. If desired, a given representation can be thought of as acting on,
say, the state space of an electron shell around a Hydrogen atom. However, the imagery of this
individual object isn’t required for our construction. Instead, we can skip directly to defining the
total angular momentum j = (n − 1)/2, in terms of the dimension n of the representation. The
angular momentum operators can then be picked out as elements of the representation, and angular
momentum in the z-direction can then be defined and shown to have the usual integer-stepped
spectrum, {−j, . . . , 0, . . . , j}.
In summary: angular momentum is recovered, with all its expected properties, from facts
about a symmetry group; no assumptions about the state ψ of an individual object are needed5. The
construction achieves roughly what Eddington suggested, that ‘[i]n fundamental investigations the
conception of group-structure appears quite explicitly as the starting point; and nowhere in the
subsequent development do we admit material not derived from group structure’ (Eddington 1958,
pp. 147). That such a development is possible is a fact about the physics. But it is also what
paves the way for a reasonable structuralist metaphysics. Wigner’s approach is just what is needed
to allow the group structural realist to speak safely of properties like angular momentum, without
recourse to an ontology of individual objects.
In particular, GSR places group structure at the top of the metaphysical hierarchy. In the
example of angular momentum, the fundamental structure is the rotational symmetry group SO(3).
A measurable physical magnitude (j) provides information about the group (in this case, it picks
out the dimension of the representation). And, if desired, one can proceed further to construct
a model of an individual object, like a hydrogen atom – but this kind of construction would be
4Spin is incorporated just as easily by replacing SO(3) with its double-covering group SU(2) and following the
same procedure.
5This standard textbook computation was first published in a book by Wigner (1931).
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metaphysically ‘secondary.’
Recent structural realists have tried to express this kind of situation in terms of invariants.
To continue the example: one can think of the rotation group as shifting around the states of an
electron shell, through the action of the group on state space6. When the states undergo this action,
the quantity j (which we associate with a real physical magnitude) remains an invariant quantity.
However, structural realists have encountered some difficulty in describing this action,
which is inevitably on something like an electron shell. An object like an electron shell might
appear to be ‘non-structural.’ So, many structural realists have tried to rephrase the situation, with
the language of action awkwardly excised. Here’s Ladyman: ‘Objects are picked out by individ-
uating invariants with respect to the transformations relevant to the context. Thus, on this view,
elementary particles are just stets of quantities that are invariant under the symmetry groups of par-
ticle physics’ (Ladyman 1998, pp. 421). Steven French follows: ‘With these invariants understood
and represented group theoretically, we arrive at a kind of structural realism which takes structure
seriously [. . . ]. Thus the elements themselves, regarded as individuals, have only a heuristic role in
allowing for the introduction of structures which then carry the ontological weight’ (French 1999,
pp. 204).
French and Ladyman’s use of the word ‘invariant’ might be misleading, if one thinks that
‘invariance under a group action’ is supposed to make sense without anything there to be acted
upon! Fortunately, Wigner’s legacy provides a more natural approach. One can begin the construc-
tion of quantum theory from a symmetry group, and still speak perfectly well about measurable
quantities. A measurable quantity like angular momentum (j) is of course derived from a repre-
sentation space, and one can speak freely about its invariance under the action on that space. The
advocate of GSR simply holds that, metaphysically, the most significant feature of this space is
that it provides a copy of the rotation group7 – and not that it refers to the possible states of an
individual object.
Construed this way, GSR leads to some surprisingly informative consequences. Let’s think
about what it would mean if spacetime had a symmetry group other than the Poincare´ group.
This new group would have different representations, and would thus allow for different properties
6In this case, the canonical action of SO(3) on the Hilbert space representation would be α : SO(3) × H → H
such that α (R,ψ(x)) = ψ(Rx), where ψ(Rx) denotes the state ψ(x) in the rotated frame.
7That is, the group of (2j + 1)× (2j + 1) matrices constructed for the representation is isomorphic to SO(3).
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of quantum systems. On Ne’eman and Sternberg’s definition, this means that there are different
‘particles.’ In fact, that is exactly what Bargmann (1954) and Le´vy-leblond (1967) have shown:
the Galilei group gives rise to a theory of ‘Galilei particles,’ which are different (in particular, with
respect to the ‘mass’ parameter) than the usual ‘Poincare´ particles.’
Let’s take another case: what would it mean for nature to admit more symmetries than just
those of spacetime? According to GSR, this larger group would provide richer representations, and
so in a sense ‘more’ properties for quantum particles. This is just what is suggested by the study of
internal symmetries. For example, Gell-Mann (1961) and Ne’eman (1961) advocated SU(3) as a
symmetry group. This led them to a new taxonomy of hadrons (as they are now called), classified
according to the irreducible representations of the new symmetry group8.
Of course, in building up a useful quantum theory, many mathematical objects besides
groups come into play: vector spaces, commutation relations, Hermitian forms, and on and on.
GSR need not deny this. Rather, GSR implies that out of all these tools, group structure is the one
of central metaphysical importance. Other realists might propose a different foundation for the
theory, perhaps by arguing (with Geoffrey Sewell) that, ‘theories of such systems should be based
on the algebraic structure of their observables, rather than on particular representations thereof’
(Sewell 2002, pp. 18)9. So, why choose GSR over all these other options? Here, the two overar-
ching aims of structural realism come into play: groups are thought to do a better job of providing
a general programmatic account of science, or of solving specific problems in the interpretation of
scientific theory.
While a general overview of all of these aims is outside the scope of this exposition10, we
can make some progress with a discussion of how GSR satisfies one popular goal for structural
realism as a metaphysical view11: to describe a realist metaphysics that gets preserved as theories
change. Let us now turn to this goal.
8For a structural realist account of internal symmetries, see (Kantorovich 2003).
9Of course, an algebra is also a group, so Sewell’s suggestion is perhaps best viewed as a closely related cousin to
GSR.
10See (Ladyman and Ross 2007) for a broad start.
11In this paper, we will not be concerned with advocates of epistemic forms of structural realism, who may not
endorse to any particular metaphysical view about structure.
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2.3 Accounting for Theory Change
Can groups do a better job at surviving theory change than individual objects? Weyl certainly
seemed to think so, remarking that, ‘We may well expect that it is just this part of quantum physics
that is most deserving of a lasting place’ (Weyl 1950, pp. xxi). More recently, Holger Lyre has
argued that ‘there is a considerable element of retention of group structure and its embedding into
a larger framework which makes the scientific progress much less discontinuous as it looks on the
level of objects’ (Lyre 2004, pp. 664). One observation to motivate these claims is this: groups are
often insensitive to a change in underlying set. So, it’s possible for the group structure of an early
scientific theory to be preserved in a later theory, even if the descriptions of objects are not.
Here’s a toy example: Imagine that some theory leads us to propose the existence of a cube.
Suppose that later, we discover that there is no cube, but rather an octahedron. This theory was
wrong about what kinds of objects exist. However, it was right about the group-structure, since
cubes and octahedrons have the same symmetry group (rotations of pi/2 about appropriate axes
preserve the orientations of both objects; so do flips about an appropriate plane). So, if we were
betting on which item would be preserved under theory change, a bet on groups would have won
out over a bet on objects.
Figure 1: An cube and an octahedron are two different objects with the same symmetry group.
Recently, French and Ladyman have suggested a more realistic examples of this: ‘it is part
of the structure of Newtonian mechanics that the laws of physics are invariant under the Galilean
transformations, and the latter are recovered in approximate form as part of the structure of rela-
tivistic physics’ (French and Ladyman 2008, §4).
It’s worth expanding on this example. As we noted above, Wigner’s legacy allows for a the-
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ory of ‘Galilei particles.’ However, the group of Galilei transformations predicts the wrong kinds
of particles (in particular, the wrong momentum eigenvalues), as well as the wrong commutation
relations12. Consequently, in the transition to the Poincare´ group, the taxonomy of fundamental
particles changed. However, ‘Galilean particles’ do happen to have the right angular momentum
quantum numbers – they allow for the possibility of spin, for example. A realist about particles
has little to say about this fact. But GSR can actually provide an explanation: it is because rotation
group is what’s metaphysically fundamental about angular momentum, and the rotation group was
preserved in the transition from the Galilei to the Poincare´ group, as a subgroup of each. As for
the Galilei group as a whole, one might say that it was also preserved in approximate form, in
low-velocity regimes.
In fact, SO(3) provides yet another precise example of preservation under theory change.
With the discovery of spin, the traditional realist should seemingly admit that a new kind of particle
was discovered, signifying a discontinuity over theory change. But, according to GSR, the impor-
tant change was really the extension of the symmetry group SO(3) to a larger group, SU(2). The
latter is the correct rotation group for a quantum theory of spin, because it admits j = 1/2-integer
representations. However, SO(3) is not rejected in this correction – it is preserved as a subgroup
of SU(2)13.
The point of these examples, for the budding structural realist, is to suggest that group
structures – not individual objects, and not even algebras of observables – are the superior candi-
dates for the survival of theory change. If this turns out to be right, then GSR not only provides a
natural, precise example of structural realism; it also stands a promising chance of satisfying the
original, ‘pessimistic meta-induction’ motivation for structural realism.
12See especially (Bargmann 1954, §6).
13SU(2) is the double-covering group of SO(3), and is thus isomorphic to the semi-direct productSO(3)⋉{1,−1}.
It follows that SO(3) is a subgroup of SU(2).
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3 The ‘Higher Structures’ Problem
3.1 The Structure of a Structure
French and Ladyman have noted the possibility that a structure might itself be describable in
structural terms; they note that this ‘hyperstructuralist route’ faces the worrisome possibility of an
infinite regress. The discussion is embedded in a response to Psillos (2006, 569-570), who argues
that structuralists will have some difficulties in accounting for causal properties. Here is part of
their response:
perhaps the most intuitively plausible form of structuralism is precisely one ac-
cording to which objects and their properties are metaphysically dissolved into a multi-
layered network of relations, where certain of these relations are causally empowered
and where this empowerment, for want of a better word, is inherent to the relation.
is that inherent empowerment non-structural? Yes, in the sense that it is not itself a
structure or describable in structural terms (if it were so describable an obvious regress
would threaten); no, in the sense that it is another aspect of the world structure. And
again, even if one were to go the hypestructuralist route, it is not clear why moving
up a level, as it were, would render causal powers as nothing but formal structure.
(French and Ladyman 2008, §6.)
The problem that French and Ladyman are addressing applies to much more than causal
structure alone (setting aside what that might be). The worry rather derives from the fact that a
relation is an amazingly general notion. Relations can describe not only objects, but also other
relations. Consequently, it is a very general fact about a structure (which is made up of relations)
that it itself often admits a structure (made up of relations between the relations). This level of
generality is crucial to almost everything that structural realism sets out to achieve. A ‘structure’ is
so general that it can describe two very different objects. (Hence, structure is more apt to survive
theory change, and so on.) A structure is so general that it can even describe other structures – it
can even describe its own structure!
If S is a structure, what is the status of the structure of S itself? Presumably, if the original
structure S were at the top of the metaphysical hierarchy, then the structure of S must have a
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secondary, derivative status – much like the status of individual objects. But then, it’s not obvious
why we should choose to place one structure at the top of the hierarchy over the other. This raises
a problem for structural realism, in the form of a dilemma. On the one horn, we would like to
choose just one structure to be at the top of our metaphysical hierarchy. But it is unlikely that we
will be able to give a well-motivated reason to choose between a structure S, and the structure
of S itself. This pushes us to the other horn: we must promote the whole shebang, both S and
the structure of S, to a metaphysically ‘fundamental’ status. But this account of metaphysics, if
one can even make sense of what counts as the ‘whole shebang,’ leads to an much more complex
hierarchy, which need not satisfy the aims of structural realism.
Of course, one can declare outright (as French and Ladyman do) that a given structure
of interest ‘is not itself a structure describable in structural terms.’ However, the status of this
claim depends on which structure one is talking about. In the case of GSR, the claim is simply
false: there is an important sense in which symmetry groups are describable terms of their own
symmetry group structure.
The ‘symmetry group structure’ describing a group G itself is called the automorphism
group, AutG. An automorphism α of a groupG is a mapping fromG to itself that preserves group
structure14. The group AutG is formed by collecting together the set of all such automorphisms,
and taking the binary operation to be functional composition. Now, to see in what sense AutG
describes the ‘symmetries’ of G, consider the following analogy with the Wigner-approach to
GSR.
Begin by presenting SO(3) as the group of rotations Rx(θ), Ry(θ), Rz(θ) of a sphere,
where x, y and z are orthogonal axes of rotation. Then there is an automorphism of SO(3) formed
by a smooth rotation of these axes, by mapping each rotation Rx(θ) to a rotation α(Rx(θ)) about a
new axis15. The class of all such automorphisms forms a subgroup of AutSO(3), which is visibly
isomorphic to SO(3) itself. The rest of the automorphisms involve an orthogonal transformation of
the axes that is not accessible by a smooth rotation, and so the full automorphism group turns out
to be given by the semi-direct product SO(3)⋊ {−1, 1} ∼= AutSO(3). The situation is illustrated
14More precisely, an automorphism on a group (X, ◦) is a bijection α : X → X such that α(x1 ◦ x2) = α(x1) ◦
α(x2).
15In particular, this is an inner automorphism. For any fixed R¯ ∈ SO(3), an inner automorphism can be defined
by the mapping αR¯ : SO(3) → SO(3) such that αR¯(R) = R¯−1RR¯. One can check that this mapping amounts to a
rotation of the orthogonal axes x,y, and z.






Figure 2: For a given presentation of SO(3), an inner automorphism α sends each rotation (left)
to its corresponding rotation about a different axis (right).
This example illustrates vividly how AutSO(3) really is the symmetry group of SO(3).
It is the group whose canonical action leaves any instantiation of SO(3) invariant. Now, on the
approach to structural realism provided by Wigner’s legacy, we elevated the rotation group SO(3)
to a privileged metaphysical status. In that discussion, the thing being rotated was something like
an electron shell. Now, in this new case, it seems we should elevate AutSO(3) instead. The only
apparent difference is that, when we elevate the status of AutSO(3), the thing getting rotated is a
presentation of SO(3) itself.
Moreover, all of the virtues of elevating SO(3) seem to carry over when we elevate the
metaphysical status of AutSO(3) instead. Note that in both cases, some important properties are
left invariant under the action of the group (that is, both can be called ‘symmetry’ groups). In the
case of the electron shell, they are the properties deriving from the total angular momentum j. In
the case of SO(3) itself, they are the properties deriving from the group structure16. Note also that
both can be taken as the basis for a construction in which the rest of quantum theory is recovered.
The only difference is, the group AutSO(3) is ‘one level more abstract,’ so that this construction
begins by constructing an invariant group SO(3), and then proceeding as usual.
As French and Ladyman suggest, an infinite regress now threatens. In general, the group
AutG will also admit an automorphism group. This gives rise to what is known as an automor-
phism tower17, given by
G, AutG, Aut AutG, . . . .
16This is because each automorphism α ∈ AutSO(3) is a group isomorphism
17See Robinson (1996, 408-415) for an introduction to the study of automorphism towers.
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As long as each successive automorphism group results in a distinct new group (more on this
later), we can continue producing new, ‘metaphysically fundamental’ structures all the way up.
Since this tower can be very high, the result is a bloated, very abstract ontology. Indeed, there are
even groups for which the tower can be continued transfinitely18. And worse: it can also happen
the groups of an automorphism tower cycle. For example, take the infinite dihedral group D∞
(which is a subgroup of any orthogonal group O(m,n)). While D∞ 6∼= AutD∞, it can be shown
that D∞ ∼= Aut AutD∞ (Hulse 1970). So the nodes of this tower bounce back and forth between
D∞ and AutD∞. Now, which of a cycling pair of group structures should the structural realist
choose?
Here is how the worry looks in the form of the above a dilemma. Horn 1. The advocate
of GSR would like to place the original group G at top of the metaphysical hierarchy. But there
does not seem to be a well-motivated reason to choose G over AutG (this is the subject of the
next subsection). This pushes GSR to: Horn 2. We instead promote the highest automorphism
group AutG in the tower, or else promote the ‘whole shebang.’ This introduces a tower’s worth of
‘lower down’ groups into our ontology, and (as we will see) does not appear to satisfy the aims of
structural realism.
In summary: group structural realism is forced to either risk arbitrariness (Horn 1), or else
adopt an overly extravagant and uninformative account of reality (Horn 2).
Trying to overcome the first horn seems to be the first natural first choice here. For ex-
ample, one might give theoretical reasons for preferring to elevate only the original group G (this
possibility will be addressed in Section 3.3). Or, one might suggest that elevating AutG doesn’t
do as good a job of satisfying the aims of structural realism, such as accounting for theory change.
Given the close similarity between G and AutG on the Wigner-approach to structural realism, this
last suggestion seems unlikely. In the case of theory change, we know that AutGwill be preserved
wheneverG is, since the former is uniquely defined by the latter. But the example of theory change
provides an even more interesting argument against the first horn: there is a precise sense in which
an AutG actually does a better job than the original group G at accounting for theory change.
Let’s have a brief discussion of why this is.
18We discuss one example below; examples may also be found in Collins (1978) and Hamkins (1998).
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3.2 Higher Structures and Theory Change
We saw in Section 2.3 that theory change can tend to favor a group G over an individual object.
The reason for this was that groups are often insensitive to a change in underlying set. As it turns
out, this is just as much a reason for thinking that theory change favors AutG over G.
Here’s another toy example: the rotational symmetry group of a triangle is the cyclic group
C3 of order three; the rotational symmetry group of a square is the cyclic group C4 of order four.
These groups are not isomorphic, but the automorphism groups AutC3 and AutC4 are19. To tell
another just-so story: suppose some theory led us to posit the existence of a triangle, and we later
discovered there is rather a square. We would have the symmetry group, as well as the object. But
the automorphism group would be preserved under this theory change.
Figure 3: The rotational symmetry group of the triangle is not isomorphic to the rotational sym-
metry group of the square. However, their automorphism groups do turn out to be isomorphic.
Here is a theoretical argument suggesting this tendency to preserve an automorphism group,
and not the original group, is very common indeed. Consider any theory in which the one-
dimensional group of rotations is a symmetry group. This includes theories involving Lorentz
group O(3, 1), the homogeneous Galilei group O(3), and both of the rotation groups that we have
been discussing (SO(3) and SU(2)). The following proposition suggests that, within such theo-
ries, favoritism towards an automorphism group is exceedingly common20:
Proposition 1. Let F contain a subgroup isomorphic to U(1), the one-parameter ‘circle group’
of rotations. Then F contains infinitely many pairs of subgroups G and H such that G 6∼= H , and
19C3 and C4 each admit just two automorphisms: the identity mapping, and the mapping that exchanges the gener-
ators. C2 is the only group of order two (up to isomorphism), so it follows that AutC3 ∼= C2 ∼= AutC4.
20We provide a proof in the Appendix to this paper.
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AutG ∼= AutH .
Here’s a just-so story to illustrate the proposition. Suppose some theory change demands
that we change our commitment from one subgroup of the Lorentz group (call it G) to another
subgroup (call it H). Our proposition says that there are infinitely many examples in which G is
not isomorphic to H , but their automorphism groups do turn out to be isomorphic. So, in many,
many cases, AutG seems to stand a better change of surviving theory change than G does.
If the advocate of GSR is motivated by theory change, it now seems that we have some
reason to consider identifying the metaphysically fundamental group with AutG, rather than with
G: the automorphism group is more apt to be preserved. This pushes us towards the second horn
of the dilemma. But before we give up on this horn, let’s discuss some other ways that a structural
realist might try to promote G over AutG.
3.3 Any Way Out for the Groupies?
So far, we’ve observed that a ‘higher structure’ – such as an automorphism group – does not fit
clearly into the cross-hairs of structural realism. Even a precise, seemingly sensible special case
like GSR does not provide a sensible way to choose which structure to promote.
However, to be fair, structural realism was not developed with higher structures in mind.
For example, higher automorphism structures are completely missed by the ‘partial isomorphisms’
approach to structural realism, which focuses on the way that structures get embedded as sub-
structures into other structures21. In this section, we discuss the possibility of refining structural
realism so as to consistently incorporate these higher structures. The bad news is that none of these
possible refinements provide a satisfactory solution.
The problem of higher structures gets its force from this fact: if S can plausibly occupy the
top position in the structural realist hierarchy, then it seems at least as plausible that the structure of
S can occupy this position. So we are faced with a dilemma: should the structural realist choose
the first horn, and seek some way to specify which is the structure of interest? Or, should she
choose the second horn, and specify many or all of the higher structures?
21For a discussion of the partial isomorphism account of theory change, see (Bueno, French, and Ladyman 2002).
See (French and Ladyman 2003) for an application of this view to structural realism.
Group Structural Realism 18
Choosing the first horn of the dilemma seems to require we choose between one of two
strategies:
• find a way to promote only structures that have no non-trivial higher structures; or
• add some apparatus that chooses a structure S over its higher structures.
Choosing the second horn of the dilemma apparently requires that we:
• allow that both S and its structure (or perhaps just the latter) somehow be promoted to the
top of the metaphysical hierarchy.
In Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, we treat each of these three options in turn.
3.3.1 Chopping Down the Tower
Not every structure has a non-trivial tower of higher structures. For example, S3, the permutation
group of three objects, has the property S3 ∼= AutS3. There is no need to choose between this
group and its automorphism group, because the two are isomorphic. Unfortunately, most important
groups in physics do not have this property. In particular, we have the following22:
Proposition 2. Every special unitary group SU(n), special orthogonal group SO(m,n), orthog-
onal group O(m,n), and kinematical group O(m,n)⋊R has a non-trivial automorphism tower.
Since almost all of the groups discussed so far lie within the scope of Proposition 2, this
strategy is not very promising. However, one might still try to replace a given group with one that
has a non-trivial automorphism tower, through the use of the following two propositions.
Theorem 1. [Cayley’s Theorem] An arbitrary group G can be embedded into SymG, the sym-
metric group23 on G (Robinson 1996, pp. 36).
Theorem 2. For every symmetric group SymG on a finite groupG (where |G| 6= 2 or 6), SymG ∼=
Aut SymG (Robinson 1996, pp. 415).
22We sketch a proof in the appendix to this paper.
23The symmetric group onG is the group of bijections fromG to itself. For finite groups of order n, SymG is often
denoted Sn, and is often called the permutation group.
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The idea is this: a structural realist might suggest that the metaphysically fundamental
group isn’t G, but rather the larger group SymG, which Cayley’s Theorem tells us G is embedded
in. Theorem 2 then (mostly) guarantees that SymG has a non-trivial automorphism tower, as long
as |G| is finite. Shirking G in favor of its permutation group might thus provide one way out of the
problem.
This idea doesn’t get us very far. The restriction that |G| be finite is very prohibitive. But
even if there is an equivalent result for infinite groups, SymG is still in a sense the worst possi-
ble choice for describing physical reality. Precisely because of Cayley’s theorem, the symmetric
groups contain all other groups as subgroups, and thus a zoo of structures that have nothing at all
to do with the physical world. So I see now ay that the general adoption of SymG can be tenable.
3.3.2 Playing Favorites
It is thus unavoidable that a symmetry group may admit a tower of higher structures. Moreover,
it is unlikely that one could in general pick out the ‘top’ of this tower, since there are groups with
towers that extend transfinitely, as well as groups with towers that cycle. So, it seems the structural
realist shouldn’t hold out much hope to pick out the top of the tower. Can the structural realist
provide some motivation for choosing the ‘bottom’ of the tower? That is, can one argue that G is
more fundamental than AutG and the other higher structures? I can imagine three non-arbitrary
ways that the one might do this: by appealing to the real world, by appealing to the mathematics,
and by appealing to the physics. None of them are very appealing.
First, one might argue that the metaphysically fundamental group is the one that is least
abstractly removed from the real world. For example, in our discussion of angular momentum,
SO(3) seems to be the most significant group, because it acts directly an electron shell. On the
other hand, AutSO(3) acts on SO(3), which in turn acts on an electron shell. This seems to give
us good reason to think that SO(3) is more metaphysically significant than AutSO(3): the former
is less abstractly removed.
However, if our goal is to pick out what’s metaphysically significant, this begs the question:
removed with respect to what? The response cannot be: ‘Removed with respect to the electron
shell.’ As discussed before, the advocate of GSR must provide an account in which groups are
what underpin the properties of objects, and not the other way around. In particular, if SO(3)
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is what provides individual objects with their properties, then it would be circular to turn around
and use an individual object to pick out SO(3). So we cannot use the notion of ‘least abstractly
removed’ to pick out the metaphysically fundamental symmetry group. (For the same reason, the
property of being ‘most abstractly removed’ won’t work either.)
Second, one might try to pick out a group G over AutG by arguing that the former is the
most mathematically informative group. After all, G fixes AutG, but the converse is generally not
true. So given an automorphism tower,
G, AutG, Aut AutG . . . ,
the group G at the bottom of the tower might be identified as the most mathematically informative,
because it uniquely determines the rest of the tower. As Armstrong might argue, if G is what’s
fundamental, then the rest of the tower is a ‘metaphysical free-lunch.’
But this suggestion won’t work either, because if the ‘bottom of the tower’ exists, it is
usually underdetermined. Note that there might well be some group H such that AutH ∼= G. In
this case, the above automorphism tower really looks like this:
H, G, AutG, Aut AutG, . . . .
There is no guarantee against an infinite regress here, by which the tower would have no bottom.
But even worse, there is often more than one such H that can extend the tower down in this way.
In this case, we have no way to choose which ‘bottom’ of the tower is intended.
To see an example of this, let’s return to the rotational symmetry group of the square C4.
This group is isomorphic to the automorphism group of C5, the cyclic group of order five24. But
C4 is also isomorphic25 to the automorphism group of C10. Therefore, we have two towers:
C5, C4, AutC4, Aut AutC4 . . . C10, C4, AutC4, Aut AutC4 . . . .
These towers have different groups ‘at the bottom,’ and we have no principled way to choose
24Here is a quick proof. Since C5 is cyclic, AutC5 ∼= Z×5 , the multiplicative group of units of the ring Z5
(Robinson 1996, Prop. 1.5.5). But 5 is prime, so Z×
5
∼= C5−1 = C4. Therefore, AutC5 ∼= C4.
25This follows from the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix to this paper.
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between them. So it appears that choosing the group at the bottom of the tower brings us right
back to where we started: we have multiple candidates for the role of ‘metaphysically fundamental’
structure, and no way to choose between them.
Finally, the structural realist might encourage us to accept a group G simply because it is
the group that is most naturally suggested by the physics. This idea is perhaps closest to the right
attitude. Physics certainly prescribes a clear role for some groups, and not for others. For example,
the rotation group SO(3) is simply a fundamental consideration in the treatment of angular mo-
mentum in quantum systems. On the other hand, it is less clear what role AutSO(3) plays. Why
not take this distinction between SO(3) and AutSO(3) seriously?
If a natural physical attitude were the target, then the structural realist should have stopped
at Wigner’s legacy. This was clearly a fruitful episode in the history of physics. However, that
simply doesn’t translate into a fruitful metaphysics. As many structural realists have argued, the
correct interpretation of these physical results is a separate question. Ladyman has hammered ‘the
impossibility of simply ‘reading one’s metaphysics off one’s physics’ (Ladyman 1998, pp. 419).
French similarly argues ‘theory itself provides no guide to ontology’ (French 1999, pp. 204).
The worry is presumably that, if we read too much into the physics, we might not end up with
the correct structural realist hierarchy. Thus, structural realists are effectively barred from this
seemingly natural scientific attitude.
If there are any other ways to coherently get around the first horn of the dilemma, then they
are not forthcoming. So let’s finally turn to the second horn, in which the entire tower – the whole
shebang of structures – is elevated to ‘metaphysically fundamental’ status.
3.3.3 Adopting the Whole Shebang
Promoting the whole shebang of higher structures may be the most well-motivated option for the
structural realist. The entire tower is certainly part of the available mathematical apparatus for
describing the world. Quite simply, it all looks like structure. So why not take it all to be equally
‘fundamental’?
For the structural realist motivated by theory change, choosing this way out is giving up
the game. The idea was supposed to be that higher, more abstract structures are more disposed
to be preserved when scientific theory changes. But adopting the whole shebang means adopting
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both the higher and the lower down structures. So, at least when it comes to theory change, the
‘whole shebang’ is only as safe as its least-abstract element. Moreover, once the entire tower has
been thrown into our ontology, it’s much less obvious why we don’t just throw in all the available
structures appearing in our theory – algebras, vector spaces, Hermitian forms, and so on. More
structures means more sensitivity to change over time. So any advantage the structural realist had
over its rival realist counterparts with respect to theory change would evaporate.
Another more homely worry about adopting the shebang is that it’s just too wild. Whether
or not an automorphism tower is finite, it still introduces a potentially enormous array of new group
structures into the metaphysical hierarchy. And it still remains to be seen how a cycling tower of
automorphisms fits into the hierarchy, as it seems impossible to call any point on such a tower
more or less fundamental. However these worries are dealt with, they invariably seem to involve
an overly extravagant ontology, which is both unmotivated and exceedingly complex. If this is
what is needed to make sense of the reality behind the physics, then it seems we might be on the
wrong track.
Perhaps this does not settle the issue. For example, one might hope that all compact Lie
groups have well-behaved automorphism towers26. However, this seems an unlikely hazard, given
the bad behavior of the infinite dihedral group D∞. As things currently stand, adopting the whole
shebang does not appear to be a promising response.
4 Conclusion
The conclusions of this paper, if they are correct, can be taken in either a positive or a negative light.
Critics of structural realism can see it as an extremely charitable criticism. Supporters of structural
realism can see it as a back-handed contribution. What I hope to have shown in both cases is that
there are two competing poles in working out a precise account of structural realism. On the one
hand, we have a compelling account of the foundations of quantum theory in which group structure
plays a central role. This account provides a great deal of insight into both the nature of measurable
quantities, as well as into what is preserved as physical theory changes. On the other hand, we have
26Indeed, we already know that the Lorentz group O(3, 1) has a very short tower: AutO(3, 1) ∼= AutAutO(3, 1)
(Michel 1967).
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the non-trivial difficulty of working out just what is meant by a ‘metaphysical hierarchy,’ and how
a vast array of relevant theoretical structures fit into it.
This problem may yet turn out to be tractable, and structural realists are invited to try to
overcome the difficulties we have posed here. However, by the lights of the current author, there is
a more natural attitude to adopt. Namely: Wigner’s legacy as shown itself be of deep importance
and relevance; the structural realist hierarchy has not. It is possible to consistently support Wigner
while avoiding this extra appendage, and so the latter may be more trouble than it’s worth.
5 Appendix
Proposition 1. Let F be a group with a subgroup isomorphic to U(1), the one-dimensional group
of smooth rotations. Then F contains infinitely many pairs of subgroups G and H such that
G 6∼= H , and AutG ∼= AutH .
Proof. Every cyclic group Cr is a subgroup of U(1), generated by a rotation of 2pi/r. We prove
that for every Cp such that p is an odd prime, AutC2p ∼= AutCp. Then since C2p 6∼= Cp, the
proposition follows from the infinitude of the primes.
For any integer n, one can show that AutCn ∼= Z×n , where Z×n is the group of multiplicative
units of the ring Zn (Robinson 1996, Prop. 1.5.5). In particular, AutCp ∼= Z×p and AutC2p ∼= Z×2p.




∼= Z×p1 × Z
×
p2
× Z×p3 × · · · .
So Z×
2p
∼= Z×2 × Z
×
p whenever p is odd. But Z×2 ∼= {1}, the trivial group. So Z×2p ∼= Z×p , and hence
AutC2p ∼= AutCp.
Proposition 2. Every non-trivial special unitary groupSU(n), special orthogonal groupSO(m,n),
orthogonal group O(m,n), and kinematical group O(m,n) ⋊ R has a non-trivial automorphism
tower.
Proof (sketch). Note that group G is said to have a non-trivial automorphism tower iffG 6≃ AutG.
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Each of the groups of Proposition 2 can be easily shown to have this property, with the help of the
following lemma:
Helpful Lemma. Let ζG be the center of a group G, and let OutG be its outer automorphism
group. If |ζG| 6= |OutG|, then G 6∼= AutG.
In this sketch, we state the Helpful Lemma without proof. (For finite groups, it can be easily
demonstrated using Lagrange’s theorem; this result can easily be extended to the infinite case.) It
can now be easily shown that for each of the symmetry groups of Proposition 2, |ζG| 6= |OutG|,
and so the Helpful Lemma may be applied.
Corollary 1. Every non-trivial (n > 1) special unitary group SU(n) has a non-trivial automor-
phism tower.
Proof. Let n > 1. It is well known that the center ζSU(n) is a cyclic group generated by γI ,
where γ is the nth root of unity (Fendley 2001, pp. 124). Thus, |ζSU(n)| = n.
Now, turn to OutSU(n). There are two cases to consider. First, let n = 2. Then the only
automorphism of OutSU(n) is trivial, so |OutSU(n)| = 1. Second, let n > 2. Then one can
show that |OutSU(n)| = 2 (Froggatt and Nielsen 1991, pp. 154). In both cases, |ζSU(n)| 6=
|OutSU(n)|. Therefore, by the Helpful Lemma, SU(n) 6∼= AutSU(n).
Corollary 2. Every special unitary group SU(n), special orthogonal group SO(m,n), orthogonal
group O(m,n), and kinematical group O(m,n)⋊ R has a non-trivial automorphism group.
Proof. The proof of these facts is straightforward, following a similar strategy of showing that
|ζG| 6= |OutG|, and then applying the Helpful Lemma. Proposition 2 then follows as a conse-
quence.
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